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Abstract
As predictive models are deployed into the real world, they must increasingly contend with strate-
gic behavior. A growing body of work on strategic classification treats this problem as a Stackelberg
game: the decision-maker “leads” in the game by deploying a model, and the strategic agents “fol-
low” by playing their best response to the deployed model. Importantly, in this framing, the burden
of learning is placed solely on the decision-maker, while the agents’ best responses are implicitly
treated as instantaneous. In this work, we argue that the order of play in strategic classification is
fundamentally determined by the relative frequencies at which the decision-maker and the agents
adapt to each other’s actions. In particular, by generalizing the standard model to allow both players
to learn over time, we show that a decision-maker that makes updates faster than the agents can
reverse the order of play, meaning that the agents lead and the decision-maker follows. We observe
in standard learning settings that such a role reversal can be desirable for both the decision-maker
and the strategic agents. Finally, we show that a decision-maker with the freedom to choose their
update frequency can induce learning dynamics that converge to Stackelberg equilibria with either
order of play.
1 Introduction
Individuals interacting with a decision-making algorithm often adapt strategically to the decision rule in
order to achieve a desirable outcome. While such strategic adaptation might increase the individuals’
utility, it also breaks the statistical patterns that justify the decision rule’s deployment. This widespread
phenomenon, often known as Goodhart’s law, can be summarized as: “When a measure becomes a target,
it ceases to be a good measure” [39].
A growing body of work known as strategic classification [13, 9, 21] models this phenomenon as a two-
player game in which a decision-maker “leads” and strategic agents subsequently “follow.” Specifically, the
decision-maker first deploys a decision rule, and the agents then take a strategic action so as to optimize
their outcome according to the deployed rule, subject to natural manipulation costs. For example, a bank
might make lending decisions using applicants’ credit scores. Knowing this mechanism, loan applicants
might sign up for a large number of credit cards in an effort to strategically increase their credit score at
little effort.
One of the main goals in the literature is to develop strategy-robust decision rules; that is, rules
that remain meaningful even after the agents have adapted to them. Recent work has studied strategies
for finding such rules through repeated interactions between the decision-maker and the agents [14, 36,
2]. In particular, the decision-maker sequentially deploys different rules, and for each they observe the
population’s response. Under certain regularity conditions, over time the decision-maker can find the
optimal solution, defined as the rule that minimizes the decision-maker’s loss after the agents have
responded to the rule.
With the emergence of online platforms such as social media and e-commerce sites, repeated interac-
























continuously monitor user behavior and update pricing algorithms, recommendation systems, and popu-
larity rankings accordingly. Users, on the other hand, take actions to ensure favorable outcomes in the
face of these updates.
A distinctive feature of online platforms is the decision-maker’s dominant computational power and
abundant data resources, allowing the platform to react to any change in the agents’ behavior virtually
instantaneously. For example, if fake news content changes over time, automated algorithms can quickly
detect this and retrain the classifier to incorporate the shift. It has been observed [see, e.g., 35, 12, 10]
that, when faced with such “reactive” algorithms, strategic agents tend to take actions that anticipate the
algorithm’s response. That is, through repeated interactions, agents aim to find actions that maximize
the agents’ utility after the decision-maker has responded to these actions. This suggests that the order of
play in strategic interactions can in fact be reversed, such that the agents “lead” while the decision-maker
“follows.”
To give an example of such a reversed strategic interaction, consider ride-sharing platforms that deploy
algorithms for determining travel fare as a function of trip length and relevant traffic conditions. These
pricing mechanisms are frequently updated based on the current supply and demand, and in particular a
dip in the supply of drivers triggers a surge pricing algorithm. Möhlmann and Zalmanson [35] observed
that drivers occasionally coordinate a massive deactivation of drivers from the system, artificially lowering
driver supply, only to get back on the platform after some time has passed and the prices have surged. In
this interaction, the drivers essentially make the first move, while the platform’s pricing algorithm reacts
to their action. Other examples of users aiming to exert control over algorithms can be found in the
context of social network analyses [12, 10].
In this work, we argue that the order of play in strategic classification is fundamentally tied to the
relative update frequencies at which the decision-maker and the strategic agents adapt to each other’s
actions. In particular, we show that, by tuning their update frequency appropriately, the decision-maker
can select the order of play in the underlying game. Furthermore, in natural settings we show that
allowing the strategic agents to play first in the game can actually be preferable for both the decision-
maker and the agents. This is contrary to the order of play previously studied in the literature, whereby
the decision-maker is always assumed to make the first move.
1.1 Our contribution
To give an overview of our results, we recall some relevant game-theoretic concepts. In the existing
literature strategic classification is modeled as a Stackelberg game. A Stackelberg game is a two-person
game where one player, called the leader, moves first, and the other player, called the follower, moves
second, with the possibility of adapting to the move of the leader. Previous work assumes that the
decision-maker acts as the leader and the agents act as the follower. This means that the decision-maker
first deploys a model, and the agents then modify their features at some cost in order to obtain a favorable
outcome according to the model. The decision-maker’s goal is to find the Stackelberg equilibrium—the
model that minimizes the decision-maker’s loss after the agents have optimally adapted to the model.
This optimal reaction by the agents is called the best response to the model.
An important parameter that has been largely overlooked in existing work is the rate at which the
agents re-evaluate and potentially modify their features. Most works studying the interaction between
a decision-maker and strategic agents implicitly assume that, as soon as the model is updated, the data
collected from strategic agents follows the best response to the currently deployed model. In the current
work we do not assume that the agents can react instantaneously to model updates. Instead, we assume
that there is a natural timescale according to which the agents adapt their features to models.
Allowing agents to adapt gradually to deployed models gives the decision-maker a new dimension
upon which to act strategically. Faced with agents that adapt gradually, the decision-maker can choose
the timescale at which they update the deployed model. In particular, they can choose a rate of updates
that is faster than the agents’ rate, or they can choose a rate that is slower than the agents’ rate. We
call decision-makers that follow a faster clock than the agents reactive, and if they follow a slower clock
we call them proactive. Given that existing work on strategic classification relies on instantaneous agent
responses, the previously studied decision-makers are all implicitly proactive.
2
Our first main result states that the decision-maker’s choice of whether to be proactive or reactive
fundamentally determines the order of play in strategic classification. Perhaps counterintuitively, by
choosing to be reactive it is possible for the decision-maker to let the agents become the leader in the
underlying Stackelberg game. Since changing the order of play changes the game’s natural equilibrium
concept, this choice can have a potentially important impact on the solution that the decision-maker
and agents find. Throughout, we refer to the Stackelberg equilibrium when the decision-maker leads as
the decision-maker’s equilibrium and the Stackelberg equilibrium when the agents lead as the strategic
agents’ equilibrium.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). If the decision-maker is proactive, the natural dynamics of strategic classifica-
tion converge to the decision-maker’s equilibrium. If the decision-maker is reactive, the natural dynamics
of strategic classification converge to the strategic agents’ equilibrium.
To provide some intuition for Theorem 1.1, imagine that one player makes updates with far greater
frequency than the other player. This allows the faster player to essentially converge to their best response
between any two updates of the slower player. The slower player is then faced with a Stackelberg problem:
they have to choose an action, expecting that the faster player will react optimally after their update.
As a result, the optimal choice for the slower player is to drive the dynamics toward the Stackelberg
equilibrium where they act as the leader.
It is well known (see, e.g., Section 4.5 in [1]) that under general losses, either player can prefer to
lead or follow in a Stackelberg game. Our second main result shows that in classic learning problems
it can be preferable for both the decision-maker and the agents if the agents lead in the game and the
decision-maker follows.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Suppose that the decision-maker implements a linear or logistic regression
model and the strategic agents aim to maximize their predicted score. Then, both the decision-maker and
the strategic agents prefer the strategic agents’ equilibrium to the decision-maker’s equilibrium.
Theorem 1.2 suggests that there are other meaningful equilibria than those previously studied in the
literature. Moreover, Theorem 1.1 proves that such equilibria can naturally be achieved if the decision-
maker is reactive. Seeing that the decision-maker’s equilibrium has also been shown to imply a cost to
social welfare [23, 34], our results pave the way for studying new, potentially more desirable solutions in
strategic settings.
1.2 Related work
Our work builds on the growing literature on strategic classification [see, e.g., 13, 9, 21, 14, 23, 34, 27,
19, 32, and the references therein]. In these works, a decision-maker seeks to deploy a predictive model
in an environment where strategic agents attempt to respond in a post hoc manner to maximize their
utility given the model. Given this framework, a number of recent works have studied natural learning
dynamics for learning models that are robust to strategic manipulation of the data [14, 23, 11, 38, 2]. Such
problems have also been studied in the more general setting of performative prediction [36, 31, 8, 33, 24].
Notably, all of these works model the interaction between the decision-maker and the agents as a repeated
Stackelberg game in which the decision-maker leads and the agents follow, and these roles are immutable.
Learning in Stackelberg games is itself a growing area in game-theoretic machine learning. Recent
work has analyzed the asymptotic convergence of gradient-based learning algorithms to local notions of
Stackelberg equilibria [16, 15, 14] assuming a fixed order of play. The emphasis has largely been on zero-
sum Stackelberg games, due to their structure and relevance for min-max optimization and adversarial
learning [15, 25]. Such results often build upon work on two-timescale stochastic approximations [6, 28]
in which tools from dynamical systems theory are used to analyze the limiting behavior of coupled
stochastically perturbed dynamical systems evolving on different timescales.
In this paper we depart from this prior work in both our problem formulation and our analysis of
learning algorithms. To begin, the problem we consider is asymmetric: one player, namely the strategic
agents, makes updates at a fixed frequency, while the opposing player, the decision-maker, can strategi-
cally choose their update frequency as a function of the equilibrium to which they wish to converge. Thus,
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unlike prior work, the choice of timescale becomes a strategic choice on the part of the decision-maker
and consequently the order of play in the Stackelberg game is not predetermined.
Our analysis of learning algorithms is also more involved than previous works since both the leader and
follower make use of learning algorithms. Indeed, throughout our paper we assume that the population
of agents is using no-regret learning algorithms, common in economics and decision theory [20, 29, 18, 22,
4, 5, 37]. This captures the reality that agents gradually adapt to the decision-maker’s actions on some
natural timescale. In contrast, existing literature on strategic classification and learning in Stackelberg
games assume that the strategic agents or followers are always playing their best response to the leader’s
action.
Given this assumption on the agents’ strategies, we then show how decision-makers who reason strate-
gically about their relative update frequency can use simple learning algorithms and still be guaranteed
to converge to game-theoretically meaningful equilibria. Our analysis complements a line of recent work
on understanding gradient-based learning in continuous games, but crucially does not assume that the
two players play simultaneously [see, e.g., 7, 30]). Instead, we analyze cases where both the agents and
decision-maker learn over time, and play asynchronously.
Some of our analyses touch on ideas from online convex optimization [40], specifically derivative-free
optimization [17]. Several works [14, 33] within strategic classification and performative prediction apply
similar zeroth-order tools to find the decision-maker’s equilibrium, but once again assuming immediate
best responses to deployed models. We show that such algorithms are versatile enough to be used without
such strong assumptions while still having strong convergence guarantees.
1.3 Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our model for studying the interaction
between a decision-maker and strategic agents that adapt gradually to deployed decision rules, and
formalize the concept of reactive and proactive decision-makers. In Section 3 we show that under natural
assumptions, a proactive or reactive decision-maker can efficiently drive the game towards the decision-
maker’s or agents’ equilibrium, respectively, by using simple learning rules. We follow this in Section 4 by
showing how in simple learning problems inducing a certain order of play can benefit both the decision-
maker and the agents. In Section 5 we present empirical results that corroborate our theory and emphasize
how having the agents lead is more desired even in previously studied models of strategic classification.
We conclude in Section 6 with a brief discussion of the questions our proposed model raises and some
directions for future work.
2 Model
We start with an overview of the basic concepts and notation, and then discuss the main conceptual
novelty of our work—implications of the decision-maker’s and strategic agents’ update frequencies.
2.1 Basic concepts and notation
Throughout we denote by z = (x, y) the (feature, label) pairs corresponding to the strategic agents’ data.
We assume that the decision-maker chooses a model parameterized by θ ∈ Θ ⊆ Rd, where Θ is convex
and closed, and that their loss is measured via a convex loss function `(z; θ). The strategic agents measure
loss via a function r(z; θ) and, collectively, they form a distribution in the family {P(µ) : µ ∈M ⊆ Rm},
where M is convex and closed. Here, µ denotes the agents’ action.
We denote L(µ, θ) = Ez∼P(µ)`(z; θ), and R(µ, θ) = Ez∼P(µ)r(z; θ). With this, the agents’ best
response is given by µBR(θ) = arg minµR(µ, θ) and the decision-maker’s best response is given by
θBR(µ) = arg minθ L(µ, θ). We assume that the best responses for both players are always unique.
If the decision-maker acts as the leader in the game, their incurred Stackelberg risk is equal to SRL(θ) =
L(µBR(θ), θ). Similarly, we let SRR(µ) = R(µ, θBR(µ)) denote the Stackelberg risk of the agents when
they lead in the game. We let θSE and µSE denote the decision-maker’s and strategic agents’ equilibrium,
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respectively: θSE = arg minθ SRL(θ) and µSE = arg minµ SRR(µ). We assume that each equilibrium is
unique.
As discussed earlier, we assume that there is an underlying timescale according to which the agents
re-evaluate their features. Specifically, after each time interval of fixed length, the agents observe the
currently deployed model, as well as their loss according to that model, and possibly modify their features
accordingly. The decision-maker, aware of the agents’ timescale, can choose to be proactive, meaning
they choose an update frequency slower than that of the agents, or reactive, meaning they choose a
higher update frequency. This power asymmetry that allows the decision-maker to choose a timescale is
characteristic of online platforms with abundant resources.
We use the term epoch to refer to a period between two updates of the slower player (which player is
the slower one is up to the decision-maker). In particular, the t-th epoch starts with a single update of
the slower player, followed by τ ∈ N updates of the faster player. The rate τ is fixed.
We use θt and µt to denote the iterate of the decision-maker and the strategic agents, respectively, at
the end of epoch t. Furthermore, for the faster player, we use double-indexing to denote the within-epoch
iterates. For example, if the decision-maker is the faster player, we use {θt,j}τj=1 to denote their iterates
within epoch t. Note that θt,τ ≡ θt. We also let θ̄t = 1τ
∑τ
j=1 θt,j . We adopt similar notation when the
agents have a higher update frequency.
2.2 Rational agents in the face of varying update frequencies
Adopting the distinction between reactive and proactive decision-makers, it is crucial to re-evaluate what
it means for the strategic agents to behave rationally. We argue that rational behavior must depend on
the relative update frequencies of the decision-maker and the agents.
As a running toy example, consider a decision-maker building a model with the goal of distinguishing
between spam and legitimate emails. The population of strategic agents aims to craft emails that bypass
the decision-maker’s spam filter. Here, µ could determine the number of words in an email, types of
words used, etc. The loss R(µ, θ) could be some decreasing function of the number of daily clicks on
email content, given spam filter θ and emails crafted according to µ. In the following discussion assume
that the timescales of the decision-maker and the agents have a significant separation: the decision-maker
is either “significantly faster” or “significantly slower.” As we will make more formal later on, our results
will generally assume a sufficiently large separation between the timescales.
Proactive decision-maker. First, assume that the decision-maker is proactive, and suppose they
deploy model θ. By definition, this model remains in place for a relatively long time, as observed by the
agents. Then, by choosing features µ, the agents experience loss R(µ, θ) during that period, and as a
result the most rational decision is to choose features µBR(θ). In the running example, if θ is a spam
filter that is in place for many months, it is rational for spammers to craft emails that are most likely to
bypass filter θ. This is just the usual best response—as we alluded to earlier, when the decision-maker is
proactive, our setup is similar to that of previous work.
Reactive decision-maker. Now assume that the decision-maker is reactive, and suppose the agents
observe θ as the current model. Then, by setting µ, the agents do not experience loss R(µ, θ). Rather,
their loss is R(µ, θR(µ)), where θR(µ) denotes the decision-maker’s reaction to the agents’ choice µ. In
the spam example, suppose that the decision-maker can aggregate and process data quickly, and retrains
the spam filter every couple of hours. Moreover, suppose that the spammers adapt their emails only
once per week. Then, the agents’ loss after choosing µ (evaluated weekly) is determined by the number
of clicks allowed by the updated filter θR(µ), not the old filter θ. Therefore, if the agents could predict
θR(µ), the agents’ optimal decision would be to choose arg minµR(µ, θR(µ)). In other words, rather than
choose the best response to θ, rational agents interacting with a reactive decision-maker would choose µ
so that it triggers the best possible reaction from θ.
We formalize this intuitive behavior by assuming that the agents are no-regret learners [37]. This
essentially means that their average regret vanishes as the number of actions grows. More formally, we
assume the following behavior depending on the relative update frequencies:
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R(µ, θt)→ 0 as τ →∞. (A1)







R(µ, θR(µ))→ 0 as T →∞, (A2)
whenever such a strategy exists. If the agents’ loss is convex, the first condition can be satisfied by simple
gradient descent. In fact, gradient descent would typically imply an even stronger guarantee, namely
the convergence of the iterates, µt,τ → µBR(θt). The second condition can be satisfied by various bandit
strategies if R(µ, θR(µ)) is Lipschitz andM is bounded (and we will impose these conditions explicitly in
the following section). That said, it seems hardly suitable to assume that the agents run a well-specified
optimization procedure. For this reason, we will for the most part avoid making explicit algorithmic
assumptions on the agents’ strategy and our main takeaways will only rely on rational agent behavior in
the limit, as in equations (A1) and (A2).
3 Learning dynamics
In this section, we study the limiting behavior of the interaction between the decision-maker and the
strategic agents. We show that, by running classical optimization algorithms, the decision-maker can
drive the interaction to a Stackelberg equilibrium with either player acting as the leader.
3.1 Convergence to decision-maker’s equilibrium
In general, we do not expect the decision-maker to be able to compute derivatives of the function SRL. For
this reason, to achieve convergence to the decision-maker’s equilibrium, we consider running a derivative-
free method. One such solution is the “gradient descent without a gradient” algorithm of Flaxman et al.
[17]. Past work [14, 33] also considers this algorithm with the goal of optimizing SRL, but it assumes
instantaneous agent responses. In other words, it assumes query access to SRL directly, while we consider
perturbations due to imperfect agent responses. It is worth noting that, under further assumptions, one
could apply more efficient two-stage approaches [33, 24] that approximate the gradients of SRL by first
estimating the best-response map µBR.
Specifically, we let the decision-maker run the following update:
φt+1 = ΠΘ(φt − ηt
d
δ









denotes the uniform distribution on the unit
sphere in Rd, ηt is a non-increasing step size sequence, and δ > 0 is a fixed hyperparameter. The
deployed model in the t-th epoch is set as θt = φt + δut.
1
We provide convergence guarantees assuming that the decision-maker’s Stackelberg risk SRL is convex.
While this condition doesn’t follow from convexity of the loss `(z; θ) alone, previous work has established
conditions for convexity of this objective for different learning problems and agent utilities [14, 33]. For
example, in the linear and logistic regression examples discussed in the following section, the decision-
maker’s Stackelberg risk will be convex.
1Technically, this assumes that we can deploy a model in a δ-ball around Θ. Another solution would be to use a
projection onto a small contraction of Θ in equation (1). This is a minor technical hurdle common in the literature. The
rate in Theorem 3.1 is unaffected by the choice of solution to this technical point.
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Theorem 3.1. Denote diam(Θ) = DΘ, and suppose that |L(µ, θ)| ≤ B for all µ, θ. Furthermore, suppose
that SRL is convex and β-Lipschitz and L(µ, θ) is βµ-Lipschitz in the first entry for all θ. Then, if the
decision-maker runs update (1) with ηt = η0d
− 12 t−
3
4 and δ = δ0d
1





























Remark 3.2. For Theorem 3.1, we assume that the agents are rational in a relatively weak sense, by
assuming no-regret behavior. Often, however, we expect the agents’ strategy to achieve iterate conver-
gence, and not just vanishing regret. More precisely, it makes sense to expect µt,τ → µBR(θt) as τ →∞.
For example, this guarantee is achieved by gradient descent in a variety of settings. In that case, the
decision-maker can simply use the last iterate instead of the average one:
φt+1 = ΠΘ(φt − ηt
d
δ





Similarly, E‖µ̄t − µBR(θt)‖2 would be replaced by E‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2 in the bound of Theorem 3.1.
In some cases, the additional regret due to imperfect agent responses does not alter the asymptotic
rate at which the decision-maker accumulates regret even if the epoch length τ is constant and does
not grow with T . To illustrate this point, we consider strategic agents that follow the gradient-descent
direction on a possibly nonconvex objective with enough curvature. More precisely, we assume that for
all θ, R(µ, θ) satisfies the Polyak- Lojasiewicz (PL) condition:
γ(R(µ, θ)− min
µ∈M
R(µ, θ)) ≤ 1
2
‖∇µR(µ, θ)‖22,
for some parameter γ > 0. Suppose that the agents’ update is computed as:
µt,j+1 = µt,j − ηµ∇µR(µt,j , θt), (4)
where ηµ > 0 is a constant step size and µt,0 = µt−1,τ . In this case, gradient descent achieves last-iterate
convergence and hence we assume that the decision-maker uses the update in equation (3).
Theorem 3.3. Assume the conditions of Theorem 3.1. In addition, suppose that R(µ, θ) is βRµ -smooth
in µ for all θ and satisfies the PL condition with parameter γ, and µBR(θ) is βBR-Lipschitz in θ. Assume
that the strategic agents run update (4) with ηµ <
1
βRµ
. Further, suppose the epoch length is chosen so
that τ > log(βRµ /γ)/ log (1/(1− γηµ)). Then, for some constant α(τ) ∈ (0, 1), we have
T∑
t=1
E‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2 ≤





Therefore, the decision-maker’s regret is O(
√
dT 3/4) even with a constant epoch length. This result
crucially depends on the fact that the optimization problems that the agents solve in neighboring epochs
are coupled through µt,0 = µt−1,τ . If µt,0 were reinitialized arbitrarily in each epoch, the extra regret
would be linear in T given constant epoch length.
By using standard tools from the stochastic approximation literature [6], in the Appendix we addi-
tionally provide convergence to local optima for the update (3) when SRL is possibly nonconvex.
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3.2 Convergence to strategic agents’ equilibrium
Now we analyze the case when the decision-maker is reactive. Given a large enough gap in update
frequencies—that is, a large enough epoch length τ—the decision-maker can converge to their best re-
sponse to the current iterate µt between any two actions of the agents. The most natural choice for
achieving this is to run standard gradient descent, θt,k+1 = θt,k − ηk∇θL(µt, θt,k). In what follows we
provide asymptotic guarantees assuming that the decision-maker runs any algorithm that achieves iterate
convergence. This condition can be satisfied by gradient descent in a variety of settings. Formally, we
assume that for any fixed µt, the decision-maker’s strategy ensures
‖θt,τ − θBR(µt)‖2 →p 0, (5)
as τ →∞. Here, →p denotes convergence in probability.
We first observe that, in the limit as τ grows, the agents’ accumulated risk is equal to their accumulated
Stackelberg risk at all the actions played so far. This simply follows by continuity.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that the decision-maker achieves iterate convergence (5) and R is continuous in
the second argument. Then, for all T ∈ N, limτ→∞
∑T
t=1 ER(µt, θt) =
∑T
t=1 ESRR(µt).
In other words, in every epoch the agents essentially play a Stackelberg game in which they lead
and the decision-maker follows. This holds regardless of whether the agents behave rationally. If they
do behave rationally (condition (A2)), we show that both the agents’ and the decision-maker’s average
regret with respect to (µSE, θBR(µSE)) vanishes if the agents’ updates are continuous. To formalize this,
suppose that for all t ∈ N, the agents set µt+1 = Dt+1(µ1, θ1, . . . , µt, θt, ξt+1), where ξt+1 is a random
variable independent of {(µi, θi)}i≤t. We include ξt+1 as an input to allow randomized strategies. Then,
we will say that the agents’ updates are continuous if Dt+1 is continuous in the first 2t coordinates for
all t ∈ N.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that the agents’ updates are continuous and rational (A2), and that M is com-
pact. Further, suppose that the decision-maker achieves iterate convergence (5) and SRR and SRL are

















EL(µt, θt) − L(µSE, θBR(µSE)) = 0.
4 Preferred order of play
While we have shown that the decision-maker can tune their update frequency to achieve either order of
play in the Stackelberg game, it remains to understand which order of play is preferable for the decision-
maker and the strategic agents. In the following examples, we illustrate that in classic learning settings
both players can prefer the order when the agents lead. This suggests that the natural and overall more
desirable order of play is sometimes reversed compared to the order usually studied.
At first, it might seem counterintuitive that the decision-maker could prefer to follow. To get some
intuition for why following might be preferred to leading, recall that in zero-sum games following is never
worse. In particular, suppose R(µ, θ) = −L(µ, θ). Then, the basic min-max inequality says








L(µ, θ) = L(µBR(θSE), θSE),
with equality if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists. Therefore, if a Nash equilibrium does not exist,
following is strictly preferred.
Since strategic classification is typically not a zero-sum game, we look at two common learning prob-
lems and analyze the preferred order of play.
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4.1 Linear regression
Suppose that the agents’ non-strategic data, (x0, y), where x0 is a feature vector and y the outcome, is
generated according to
x0 ∼ N(0, Id), y = x>0 β + ξ, ξ ∼ N(0, σ2),
where β ∈ Rd is an arbitrary fixed vector. We denote the joint distribution of (x0, y) by P(0).
Recall that we use z to denote the pair (x, y). Suppose that the decision-maker runs standard linear





The agents aim to maximize their predicted outcome, r(z; θ) = −θ>x, subject to a fixed budget on
feature manipulation—they can move to any x at distance at most B from their original features x0:
‖x− x0‖2 ≤ B. A similar model is considered by Chen et al. [11]. More precisely, we let M = {µ ∈ Rd :
‖µ‖2 ≤ B} and define P(µ) to be the distribution of (x, y), where (x0, y) ∼ P(0) and x = x0 + µ. Then,
R(µ, θ) = Ez∼P(µ)r(z; θ) = −µ>θ and L(µ, θ) = Ez∼P(µ)`(z; θ).
We prove that both the decision-maker and the agents prefer the agents’ equilibrium.





2(1 + min(1, B)2)








1 + min(1, B)2




When B ≤ 1, the losses implied by the two scenarios are the same, while when B > 1, having the
agents lead is strictly better for both players. Moreover, the strategic agents’ manipulation cost is no
higher when they lead: ‖µSE‖2 ≤ ‖µBR(θSE)‖2.
4.2 Logistic regression
Next we consider a classification example. Suppose that the non-strategic data is generated as
y ∼ Bern (p) and x0|y ∼ N((2y − 1)α, σ2I).
In other words, x0|y = 1 ∼ N(α, σ2I) and x0|y = 0 ∼ N(−α, σ2I). We denote the joint distribution over
(x0, y) by P(0).
We assume that the decision-maker trains a logistic regression classifier:
`(z; θ) = −yx>θ + log(1 + ex
>θ).
The agents with y = 0 can manipulate their features to increase the probability of being positively labeled.
A similar setup is considered by Dong et al. [14]. As in the previous example, the agents have a limited
budget to change their features: if their non-strategic features are x0, they can move to any x which is
at distance at most B from x0, ‖x− x0‖2 ≤ B. Thus, we set M = {µ ∈ Rd : ‖µ‖2 ≤ B} and denote by
P(µ) the joint distribution of (x, y) where (x0, y) ∼ P(0) and x = x0 + µ1{y = 0}. We impose a mild
condition that B ≤ ‖α‖2, so that the population whose true outcome is 0 cannot move closer to α than
−α. We let R(µ, θ) = −µ>θ and L(µ, θ) = Ez∼P(µ)`(z; θ).
Proposition 4.2. Assume the logistic regression setup described above. Then, we have
L(µSE, θBR(µSE)) ≤ SRL(θSE) and SRR(µSE) ≤ R(µBR(θSE), θSE).
There exist configurations of parameters such that the inequalities in Proposition 4.2 are strict, mean-
ing that both players strictly prefer the agents to lead. We illustrate this empirically. In Figure 1 we plot
the difference in risk between the two equilibria for the decision-maker and the agents, for varying B and
p. For large p and small B, we see no difference between the equilibria. However, as p decreases and B
increases, it becomes suboptimal for both players if the decision-maker leads.
9
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Figure 1: Difference in decision-maker’s and agents’ risk implied by the two Stackelberg equilibria, for
different values of B and p. We set d = 1, α = 2, σ = 1.
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Figure 2: Decision-maker’s and agents’ average running risk for varying p and B = 2. The dotted lines
denote the loss at the respective equilibria. For p = 0.9, the decision-maker’s equilibrium and the agents’
equilibrium coincide and hence both curves converge to the same value.
5 Experiments
As proof of concept, we demonstrate our theoretical findings empirically in a simulated logistic regression
setting. In the first set of experiments, we adopt the model from Section 4.2 where agents are constrained
in how they modify their features. In the second set of experiments we adopt a model more akin to that
of Dong et al. [14] where the negatively classified agents are penalized from deviating from their true
features. The details of all numerical results are deferred to the end of this section.
In both settings, first we let the decision-maker lead and the agents follow, and then we switch the
roles. For both orders of play, the slower player runs the derivative-free update (3), and the faster
player runs standard (projected) gradient descent. To be able to analyze the long-run behavior, we also
numerically approximate the Stackelberg risks of the decision-maker and the strategic agents and find
the global minima which correspond to the decision-maker’s and agents’ equilibria respectively.
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Figure 3: Decision-maker’s and agents’ average running risk for varying p and B = 1. The dotted lines
denote the loss at the respective equilibria. For all values of p, the decision-maker’s equilibrium and the
agents’ equilibrium coincide and hence both curves converge to the same value.
5.1 Agents with constraints
To begin, we verify our theoretical findings from Section 4.2. We generate 100 samples, fix α = 2, σ = 1,
d = 1, and vary B and p. We run the interaction for a total of T = 50000 epochs, with each epoch of
length τ = 200.
In Figure 2 and Figure 3 we plot the decision-maker’s and the agents’ average running risk against
the number of epochs, for the two different orders of play, for B = 2 and B = 1, respectively. For
p ∈ {0.1, 0.5} and B = 2, we observe a clear gap between leading and following, the agents leading being
the preferred order for both players. For p = 0.9 or B = 1, the two equilibria coincide asymptotically;
however, generally we find that the two players still prefer the agents to lead even after a finite number
of epochs.
5.2 Agents with costly deviations
In this section, we verify our findings on a model where the decision-maker’s problem is the same logistic
regression problem posed in Section 4.2, but the strategic agents are penalized for deviating from their




‖µ‖2 − µT θ.
We note that although this setup is conceptually very similar to that in Section 4.2 (increasing λ can
be seen as shrinking the constraint set), it allows us to highlight that the experimental results are not
caused by interactions with the constraints. Further, this setup is more readily comparable to previous
models studied in, e.g., [14].
We generate 100 samples in R2, fix α = 1.5[1, 1]T and σ = 1, and vary λ and p. We run the interaction
for a total of T = 50000 epochs, with each epoch of length τ = 100. In Figure 4 and Figure 5 we plot the
decision-maker’s and the agents’ average running risk against the number of epochs, for the two different
orders of play and for λ = 1 and λ = 20 respectively.
In Figure 4 we observe a gap between the decision-maker’s risk at their Stackelberg equilibrium and
at the agents’, and see that the decision-maker consistently achieves a lower risk when the agents lead.
11
Figure 4: Decision-maker’s and agents’ average running risk for varying p and λ = 1. The dotted lines
denote the loss at the respective equilibria.
Further, we note that agents consistently prefer leading, meaning that both the decision-maker and agents
prefer if the order of play is flipped. In Figure 5 we observe that as λ and p increase, the gap between the
two equilibria shrinks and disappears entirely when p = 0.9 and λ = 20. This is similar to the behavior
seen in the constrained agent problem where shrinking the constraint set can give rise to Nash equilibria
where neither player strictly prefers leading or following.
6 Discussion
We have shown how the consideration of update frequencies allows natural learning dynamics to converge
to Stackelberg equilibria where either player can act as the leader. Moreover, we observed that the
previously unexplored order of play in which the agents lead can result in lower risk for both players. We
have only begun to understand the implications of reversing the order of play in strategic classification,
and update frequencies in general, and many questions remain open for future work.
In social settings, there are many considerations and concerns beyond minimizing risk. While our
preliminary observations suggest that reversing the order of play might have benefits, we have yet to fully
understand the impact of this reversed order on the population interacting with the model. That said,
we do not propose a new type of interaction; real-world decision-making algorithms already possess, and
employ, the power to be reactive. Our new framework is simply flexible enough to capture the difference
between proactive and reactive decision-makers.
Furthermore, we assume that the agents act on a fixed timescale. Sometimes it is possible for the
agents to choose their timescale strategically. In that case, there is first a “meta-game” between the
decision-maker and the agents, as they might compete for the leader/follower role. For example, if
both prefer to lead, then both might aim to make slow updates to reach the leader position; perhaps
surprisingly, this incentive might prevent any interaction at all.
Finally, we study order-of-play preferences only in linear/logistic regression with linear agent utilities.
There are many other learning settings and classes of agents’ utilities and costs in the literature, and
going forward it is important to obtain general conditions when leading (or following) is preferable.
12
Figure 5: Decision-maker’s and agents’ average running risk for varying p and λ = 20. The dotted lines
denote the loss at the respective equilibria. For p = 0.9, the decision-maker’s equilibrium and the agents’
equilibrium coincide and hence both curves converge to the same value.
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A Proofs
Lemma A.1. Suppose that M is compact. If the decision-maker is proactive and the strategic agents’







E‖µj,τ − µBR(θt)‖2 = 0.



















E‖µt − µSE‖2 = 0.
Proof. We will prove the second statement; the proof of the first statement is completely analogous.
By the uniqueness of µSE and compactness ofM, notice that for all µ and ε > 0 such that ‖µ−µSE‖2 ≥




t=1 E‖µt − µSE‖2 6→ 0, then that must imply positive regret in the limit, which concludes the proof
by contradiction.








Then, that implies that for every ε > 0, there is a sequence {ak}∞k=1 such that 1ak
∑ak
t=1 distt > ε for all
k. Fix 0 < ε′ < ε, and denote pk =
1
ak






distt ≤ pkDM + ε′,
where DM = maxµ,µ′∈M ‖µ− µ′‖2. Therefore, pk ≥ ε−ε
′
DM
> 0. This shows that in the sum 1ak
∑ak
t=1 distt
there is a constant fraction of terms outside a ball of radius ε′ around µSE, in expectation. Fix one such
term distt∗ . Then, we know
ε′ ≤ distt∗ ≤ lim
τ→∞
P{‖µt∗ − µSE‖2 ≥ ε′/2}DM + ε′/2.
Therefore, we can conclude that limτ→∞ P{‖µt∗ − µSE‖2 ≥ ε′/2} ≥ ε
′
2DM
> 0. On this event, we also







ESRR(µt)− SRR(µSE) ≥ ∆ > 0,
and this holds for all terms in the sequence {ak}. This finally implies that 1T
∑T
t=1 ESRR(µt) −





A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1




Eu∼S [SRL(θ + δu)u],
where S denotes the unit sphere. Denote by θ̂SE the optimum of ŜRL, and notice that ŜRL is convex
since SRL is convex.
For any fixed t, we have
‖φt+1 − θ̂SE‖22 ≤ ‖φt − ηt
d
δ
L(µ̄t, φt + δut)ut − θ̂SE‖22
≤ ‖φt − θ̂SE‖22 − 2ηt
d
δ
L(µ̄t, φt + δut)u
>
t (φt − θ̂SE) + η2t
d2
δ2
‖L(µ̄t, φt + δut)ut‖22
≤ ‖φt − θ̂SE‖22 − 2ηt
d
δ
L(µ̄t, φt + δut)u
>




Focusing on the middle term, we have
L(µ̄t, φt + δut)u
>
t (φt − θ̂SE) = L(µ̄t, φt + δut)u>t (φt − θ̂SE)± L(µBR(θt), φt + δut)u>t (φt − θ̂SE)
≥ L(µBR(φt + δut), φt + δut)u>t (φt − θ̂SE)− βµ‖µ̄t − µBR(θt)‖2DΘ.
Denote εt
def
= E‖µ̄t − µBR(θt)‖2. Taking expectations of both sides, we get
EL(µ̄t, φt + δut)u>t (φt − θ̂SE) ≥ L(µBR(φt + δut), φt + δut)u>t (φt − θ̂SE)− βµDΘεt.
Returning to equation (6) and taking expectations of both sides, we get
E‖φt+1 − θ̂SE‖22 ≤ E‖φt − θ̂SE‖22 − 2ηt(E[∇ŜRL(φt)>(φt − θ̂SE)]− βµDΘεt) + η2t
d2B2
δ2























































where we use the fact that ηt is non-increasing.























Setting ηt = η0d
− 12 t−
3
4 and δ = δ0d
1















For the second statement, observe that






and the right-hand side tends to zero in expectation as τ →∞ by Lemma A.1.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.3
By standard convergence guarantees of gradient descent on PL objectives [26], we have
‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2 ≤
√





γ . Denote εt
def
= ‖µt− µBR(θt)‖2. We will show that εt decays fast enough due to the decay
in ηt. In particular, we have
εt = ‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2 ≤
√
κ(1− γηµ)τ/2‖µt−1 − µBR(θt)‖2
=
√
κ(1− γηµ)τ/2‖µt−1 − µBR(θt−1) + µBR(θt−1)− µBR(θt)‖2
≤
√
κ(1− γηµ)τ/2 (‖µt−1 − µBR(θt−1)‖2 + ‖µBR(θt−1)− µBR(θt)‖2)
≤
√




















) . Then we have that α(τ) def= √κ(1− γηµ)τ/2 < 1.
(Note that as τ increases, α(τ) can be driven to zero.) Altogether, we find that:




Unrolling the recursion, we find that































































For ηt = η0d















A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Define µ∗t = Dt(µ1, θBR(µ1), . . . , µ
∗









ESRR(µt)− SRR(µSE) = 0. (7)




























(ESRR(µt)− ESRR(µ∗t )) ,
where the last step follows by the assumption that the agents play a rational strategy. Therefore, if
µt →p µ∗t , continuity of SRR(µ) implies ESRR(µt)− ESRR(µ∗t )→ 0 and we get the desired conclusion.
We prove that µt →p µ∗t by induction. Notice that µ1 ≡ µ∗1 by definition. Suppose that µj →p µ∗j for
all j < t. Denote by θj,τ the possibly randomized algorithm that maps µj to θj . Then, for any µ ∈ M,
we know that ‖θj,τ (µ)− θBR(µ)‖2 →p 0 by assumption. This in turn implies that for all j < t,
‖θj,τ (µj)− θBR(µ∗j )‖2 ≤ ‖θj,τ (µj)− θBR(µj)‖2 + ‖θBR(µj)− θBR(µ∗j )‖2 →p 0,
where the second term tends to zero by the continuous mapping theorem. Finally, we can apply the
continuity of Dt to conclude that µt →p µ∗t , as desired.
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E[L(µt, θt,τ )− L(µt, θBR(µt)].
By Lemma A.1, the guarantee (7) implies that the first term vanishes. The second term vanishes by









EL(µt, θt)− L(µSE, θBR(µSE)) = 0,
as desired.
A.4 Proof of Propositon 4.1
First we assume the decision-maker leads. When θ is the deployed model, the best response by the agents
is to simply move by distance B in the direction of θ. Thus, µBR(θ) is given by:
µBR(θ) = arg min
µ




This implies the following expected loss for the decision-maker:





















This objective is convex and thus by finding a stationary point we observe that it is minimized at
θSE =
β
1+B2 . By plugging this choice back into the previous equation, we observe that the minimal
Stackelberg risk of the decision-maker is equal to







Moreover, the agents’ loss at θSE is equal to:




Now we reverse the order of play and assume that the agents lead. If the agents move by µ; i.e., they
follow the law P(µ), then the decision-maker incurs loss:

















By computing a stationary point, we find that the best response of the decision-maker is:








The Stackelberg risk of the strategic agent is then
















Among all µ such that ‖µ‖2 = C, SRR(µ) is minimized when µ points in the β direction: µ = C β‖β‖2 .







This function is decreasing for C ∈ (0, 1], and increasing for C > 1. Therefore, µSE = min(1, B) β‖β‖2 , and
SRR(µSE) = −‖β‖2
min(1, B)
1 + min(1, B)2
.







































2(1 + min(1, B)2)
.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2
First we evaluate L(µ, θ):
L (µ, θ) = E(x,y)∼P(µ)
[









= pEx0∼N(α,σ2I) log(1 + e
−x>0 θ) + (1− p)Ex0∼N(α,σ2I) log(1 + e
−x>0 θ+µ
>θ)
= pEz∼N(0,σ2) log(1 + e−α
>θ+‖θ‖2z) + (1− p)Ez∼N(0,σ2) log(1 + e−α
>θ+‖θ‖2z+µ>θ).
We prove that the agents are never worse off if they lead, for all p ∈ [0, 1]. We will provide a sufficient








This immediately implies that SRR(µSE) ≤ R(µBR(θSE), θSE).
To see this, first observe that













Here we use the fact that the best response of the agents is to simply move by distance B in the direction
of θ:



















p log(1 + e−α







































Now we analyze the decision-maker’s preference. We write
L(µ, θ) = −α>θ + pEx0∼N(α,σ2I) log(e
x>0 θ + 1) + (1− p)Ex0∼N(α,σ2I) log(e
x>0 θ + eµ
>θ).
This loss is increasing in µ>θ; that is, for any θ it holds that maxµ L(µ, θ) = L(µBR(θ), θ). Using this,
we observe that for every θ we have
L(µSE, θBR(µSE)) ≤ L(µSE, θ) ≤ max
µ∈M
L(µ, θ) = SRL(θ).
Since this also holds for θ = θSE, we conclude that following is never worse than leading for the decision-
maker.
B Local guarantees when SRL is nonconvex
We provide local guarantees in the limit when the decision-maker’s Stackelberg risk is possibly nonconvex.
Specifically, we show that the update rule (3) converges to a stationary point of a smooth version of
the decision-maker’s Stackelberg risk, provided that the strategic agents achieve iterate convergence.
Moreover, under mild regularity conditions, this stationary point is a local minimum (see, e.g., Theorem
9.1 in [3]).
Proposition B.1. Assume that the agents achieve iterate convergence, ‖µt−µBR(θt)‖ → 0 almost surely
as t→∞. Further, assume that the decision-maker’s Stackelberg risk is Lipschitz and smooth, and that
L(µ, θ) is Lipschitz in its first argument and bounded for all µ and θ. If the decision-maker runs update
(3) with ηt satisfying
∑∞




t < ∞, and δ = ε4β , then as t → ∞, φt → φ
∗ such that
∇ŜRL(φ∗) = 0, where ŜRL(φ) = Ev∼Unif(B) [SRL(φ+ δv)].
Proof. The proof makes use of results from the literature on stochastic approximation [see, e.g., Theorem
9.1 in 6].
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As in the proof of Theorem 3.1, let ŜRL(φ) = Ev∼Unif(B) [SRL(φ+ δv)], and recall θt = φt + δut,
ut ∼ Unif(Sd−1). We begin by writing the update for φt as:
φt+1 = φt − ηt
∇φŜRL(φt)−


















we know Eu[I] = 0. Since L is bounded and SRL is smooth, we know ‖I‖2 is bounded. Thus, I is a
zero-mean random variable with finite variance.
For term II, we use the assumed Lipshchitzness of L in the first argument to find that:
‖II‖2 ≤ βµ‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2‖ut‖2
= βµ‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2,
where we use the fact that ‖u‖2 = 1. By assumption, ‖µt − µBR(θt)‖2 → 0 almost surely as t → ∞.
Thus, we can write the update rule as:
φt+1 = φt − ηt
(
∇φŜRL(φt) + ξt +Mt
)
,
where ξt = o(1) and Mt is a zero-mean random variable with finite variance. Since the assumed choice
of ηt satisfies
∑∞




t < ∞ we can invoke Chapter 2, Corollary 3 in [6] to find that
φt → φ∗ ∈ {φ : ∇φŜRL(φ) = 0}.
C Experimental details






in the proof of Proposition 4.2, with 1000 steps of gradient descent. We approximate the relevant
expectation via a sample average over 1000 samples x0 ∼ N(α, σ2). Once we have θSE, we compute
µBR(θSE) =
θSE
‖θSE‖2B. To find the agents’ equilibrium, we perform grid search over 1000 equally spaced
points in the interval [−B,B]. For each point in the grid, we compute the relevant best response θBR(µ)
by running 1000 steps of gradient descent, again estimating the expectation over 1000 samples. We take
as the agents’ equilibrium the point µ in the grid that minimizes the estimated value of R(µ, θBR(µ)).
To generate Figures 2 and 3, in all experiments we set the step size of the faster player, that is,
the one running gradient descent, to 0.1. When the decision-maker leads, we set their step size to be
ηt = η0t
−3/4, where η0 = 6 for p = 0.1, η0 = 5 for p = 0.5, and η0 = 10 for p = 0.9. When the agents
lead, we set their step size to be ηt = 0.02t
−3/4. We let the perturbation parameter δ decrease with time,
and set δt = t
−1/4.
To generate Figure 4, when the decision-maker leads, we set their step size to be ηt = 0.1t
−3/4. When
the agents lead, we set their step size to be ηt = 0.01t
−3/4. We let the perturbation parameter δ decrease
with time, and set δt = t
−1/4. When the decision-maker and agents follow, their step sizes for gradient
descent are 0.1 and 0.01, respectively. To generate Figure 5 all parameters are kept the same except when
the decision-maker leads, we set their step size to be ηt = t
−3/4.
To compute the decision-maker’s and agents’ risk at the decision-maker’s equilibrium, we explicitly




‖θ‖2B and µBR(θ) =
1
λθ in the two respective settings. We then minimize this risk directly
using gradient descent with a fixed step size of 0.1.
To compute the decision-maker’s and agents’ risk at the agents’ equilibrium, we compute their Stack-
elberg risk over a grid by fixing µ and running gradient descent with step size 0.1 on the decision-maker’s
problem until convergence for each value of µ. We then find the agents’ equilibrium by searching for the
minimal estimate of R(µ, θBR(µ)) over the grid.
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